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1 Introduction
In 1820, the world was made up of 125 countries and long-distance trade was very modest
less than 5% of world output. Over the following century, international trade grew more than
four-fold while the number of countries fell to merely 54. The interwar period witnessed a
reversal of these trends: trade collapsed and the number of sovereign states rose to 76 by
1949. Until then, political and economic integration had proceeded together. But the end
of World War II marked the beginning of a new era. After 1950 trade between nations has
ourished to levels never seen before. But this time the process of economic integration
has been accompanied by di¤erent changes in the world political structure. On the one
hand, the number of countries has risen to a record high of more than 190, so that more
trade is now accompanied by political fragmentation. On the other hand, there has been
a proliferation and growth of international treaties and unions aimed especially at fostering
economic integration, such as the World Trade Organization and the European Union.
These trends are illustrated graphically in Figure 1, which shows the historical evolution
of the number of sovereign states in the world, average exports as a share of GDP and the
number of members of the GATT/WTO. The data on the number of states was obtained from
Butcher and Gri¢ ths (2013).1 Since counting the number of sovereign countries in the past
poses some challenges, especially in remote and underdeveloped areas, in Figure 2 we plot
an alternative measure of political concentration:2 the average land size of internationally
recognized countries and of thirteen major empires since 1830, from the Cross-National
Time-Series Data Archive. Both gures tell a remarkably similar story. During the rst
wave of globalization in the nineteenth century there was a phase of political concentration
in which countries and empires expanded their territories. But this trend reversed in the
second wave of globalization after World War II, which saw the collapse of large empires and
a steady fall in average country size, together with an expansion in trade agreements.
Figure 3 illustrates another feature of the historical redrawing of political borders, namely
the incidence of violence in the process. It displays the share of territorial changes that
involved military conict computed on all territorial changes recorded over a period of ten
years before and after each date, from the Correlates of War Project. The gure clearly
shows that the end of World War II marks another structural break: before 1950, more than
1See Appendix A.1 for more details about the data.
2Most importantly, the commonly used International System(Singer and Small 1966), including coun-
tries with international recognition, grossly underestimates the number of independent political entities in
the nineteenth-century developing world.
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Figure 1: Trade share (right axis), the number of countries and WTO membership (left
axis.) See appendix for details on data.
one third of all territorial disputes were decided by war, while after that date diplomacy
prevailed in almost 90% of cases.
Why did the rst wave of globalization lead to political concentration and conict? Why
did the second wave of globalization lead instead to political fragmentation, resolved in a
more peaceful way? To answer these questions, this paper develops a theoretical framework
to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We dene globalization
as a process by which markets expand and the potential gains from trade grow. There is
wide consensus that globalization started around the mid nineteenth century and that it was
fueled by major technological advancements, sustained economic growth and the adoption of
market-promoting policies (Fouquin and Hugot 2016; Pascali 2017). In this paper, we take
the technological determinants of globalization, triggered by the stream of innovations that
started after the Industrial Revolution, as an exogenous driving force. We then study how
market-expanding policies react to it.
A key premise behind our work is that borders hamper trade and globalization makes
borders more costly. Thus, political structure needs to adapt to expanding trade opportuni-
ties by removing borders or reducing their cost. Our theory shows that this process entails
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Figure 2: Size of countries (left axis) and empires (right axis). Thousand squared miles, see
the appendix for details on data.
a non-monotonic evolution of country size, consistent with the evidence in Figures 1 and 2.
In its early stages, the political response to globalization consists of removing borders by
creating large countries. In its later stages, instead, the political response to globalization is
to remove the cost of borders by creating international economic unions, and this leads to
a reduction in the size of countries. We also show that while the incentive to conquer mar-
kets through aggression increases with globalization, the formation of international economic
unions removes this incentive, thereby paving the way to the rule of diplomacy.
To obtain these results, we consider a symmetric world with a continuum of basic geo-
graphical units or localities, each containing people that share common preferences. Goods
can be transported at a negligible cost within localities, but at a positive cost across lo-
calities. Governments perform two tasks in this world. First, they provide the economic
regulation necessary for markets to work, such as contract enforcement and protection of
property rights. Second, they provide their residents with public services such as education
and welfare programs. We ask how governments are organized geographically to perform
these tasks and, in particular, how this organization changes as the cost of transporting
goods across localities declines.
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Figure 3: Share of changes of borders involving military conict. Each point corresponds to
an average over a +/-10 year window. Source: Correlates of War.
We make two standard assumptions about the e¤ects of governments. The rst is the
presence of border e¤ects. Localities that have di¤erent governments providing economic
regulation can only trade a limited range of goods, while localities that share a single gov-
ernment can trade all goods. The second assumption is preference heterogeneity over public
services. Yet, localities that share a single government providing public services are forced
to receive a single undi¤erentiated basket.
We assume that local preferences di¤er with respect to public services but not economic
regulation. This assumption reects the notion that market-enabling economic regulation
aims primarily at increasing e¢ ciency. This goal is widely shared by people with di¤erent
distributive preferences (Coase 1960; Posner [1973] 2014). Accordingly, government func-
tions such as contract enforcement, monetary policy, or the policing of anti-competitive
practices are often entrusted to apolitical technocrats. On the contrary, public services are
a focus of political tension because people have di¤erent views on how children should be
educated, on the proper size and scope of the welfare system, and so on. Such preferences
vary systematically across localities because they reect their distinctive history and culture.
If there were no costs of government, the optimal political structure for this world would
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be a two-level governance structure. The rst level would be a continuum of country gov-
ernments, one for each locality, providing each of them with its preferred basket of public
services. The second level would be a world government or economic union that regulates
markets and eliminates all border e¤ects. Unfortunately, there are costs of government and
this political structure is too expensive.
We make two standard assumptions about the costs of government. The rst is that they
are subject to economies of scale. There are some costs of setting up and running a gov-
ernment that are xed or independent of the number of localities sharing this government.
The second assumption is that costs of government are also subject to economies of scope.
Coordinating di¤erent levels of government is costly and, as a result, the two-level gover-
nance structure is more expensive than a single-level structure in which country governments
provide both public services and market regulations.
Economies of scale and scope a¤ect the optimal political structure. Economies of scale
make it more desirable to have a discrete number of country governments rather than a
continuum of them. Localities are willing to accept public services that are less than ideally
tailored to their preferences in order to save some costs of government. Economies of scope,
if large enough, make it more desirable to have a single-level governance structure than a
two-level one. Localities may also be willing to accept higher trade costs in order to save
some costs of government.
Thus, the organization of the state is determined by the interplay of four forces: preference
heterogeneity, the border e¤ect, economies of scale and economies of scope.3 We then ask
how a reduction in transport costs across localities a¤ects the organization of government.
Reduced transport costs raise the gains from trade and strengthen the incentive to remove
borders. This economic primitive generates a non-monotonic e¤ect on political structure.
A key aspect of any theory of political structure is a view of how localities interact. As
a preliminary step, in Section 3 we consider the case in which localities are sovereign and
bargain e¢ ciently. At early stages of globalization, the gains from trade are small and the
benet of creating an economic union does not justify the loss of economies of scope. Thus,
a single-level governance structure is optimal. As globalization proceeds, localities remove
borders by increasing the size of countries. The number of countries declines and the mis-
match between each localitys ideal and actual provision of public services grows. Eventually,
3Although these forces are standard in the theoretical literature, the reader might still wonder whether
our focus on them is justied empirically. We discuss the relevant empirical evidence in Section 2.2, after
clarifying the role of each of these forces in our analysis.
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this mismatch is large enough to justify a move to a two-level governance structure. The
world political structure shifts from a few large countries to many small countries within a
world economic union. The two-level structure is more expensive, but it is nonetheless desir-
able because it facilitates trade and improves preference-matching in the provision of public
services. Our result of a shift from a single-level to a two-level architecture of government is
consistent with the seemingly opposite reactions of the world political structure to the rst
and second waves of globalization.
This case can be interpreted as the rule of diplomacy. But diplomacy is hardly the only
form of interaction in the real world. To capture this, in Section 4 we allow a set of core
localities to wage war and build empires. War is costly but it allows core localities to impose
their preferences on colonies. In this case, we show that there is an intermediate stage of
globalization in which core localities choose to wage war and build large empires that grow
rapidly in size. These empires eventually collapse as the world enters the third and nal
stage of globalization. The world economic union makes them obsolete. Interestingly, the
cause of imperial collapse at a late stage of globalization is exactly the same as the cause for
the rise of empires at an early stage, namely, the desire to reap gains from trade. It is just
that, at some point, it becomes more cost-e¢ cient to replace conquered colonies with free
partners in an economic union.
These results are obtained in a setup that imposes a symmetric geography. In Section 5,
we break the symmetry of the baseline model and assume that localities in the core are near
each other, while localities in the periphery are far from the core and from each other. The
main new result is that the core has a stronger incentive to form a core union, which may
be subsequently enlarged to include periphery countries. This extension is useful because it
helps us understand why the process of union formation tends to be gradual and often starts
at the regional level. It can also explain why global empires controlling far-away colonies are
replaced by peaceful regional unions of nearby countries.
The picture that arises from our stylized model is rich and suggestive, and it improves
our understanding of the determinants of political structure. To show this, in Section 6 we
use our analytical results to interpret a variety of specic historical experiences. In light of
recent events, we also ask what lessons, if any, can be learned for the future of the European
Union. We conclude in Section 7 by reviewing some of the limitations of our theory and
some promising avenues for further research. In the rest of this introduction, we o¤er a brief
review of the related literature.
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Related Literature Our theory builds upon Alesina and Spolaores (1997) seminal work
on the equilibrium determination of the number and size of countries. Their rich theory
of country formation hinges on the trade-o¤ between economies of scale and preference
heterogeneity.4 Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000, 2005) add to the theory the trade-
reducing e¤ect of international borders. They show that when borders become less of an
impediment to trade, the optimal political structure reacts by creating more borders. This
approach can explain the increase in the number of countries during the second wave of
globalization, if globalization is taken to be a weakening of the border e¤ect. However, these
papers take the decline in the border e¤ect as exogenously given and cannot explain why the
rst wave of globalization was accompanied instead by a decline in the number of countries.
Moreover, they assume throughout that economies of scope are prohibitive, so that the state
must always be organized in a single level of government. Thus, they do not explain the
proliferation and growth of economic unions during the second wave of globalization.
We extend this earlier work in two key ways. Our rst and most important novelty lies
in recognizing that economies of scope are limited. This innovation enriches the analysis
by realistically expanding the set of political structures that may emerge in equilibrium.
Our second extension is to study a more primitive technological driver of globalization:
the gradual decline of transportation costs. This change in focus enables us to show that
globalization makes borders costlier rather than cheaper, and creates incentives to remove
them rather than to create them. The decline in the border e¤ect emphasized by Alesina,
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000, 2005) is in fact endogenous to the development of political
structure in response to expanding trade opportunities. Not only does our theory microfound
the driving force behind their model. More important, we show that the transition from
single-level to multi-level governance is crucial to explain why globalization led to a decline
in the number of countries during the nineteenth century, but then to its increase during the
twentieth.
The observed reversal in the link between globalization and country size remained an
open puzzle so far. Some papers have investigated other aspects of the interaction between
economic and political integration, such as the e¤ects of trade on preferences and income
distribution. Casella (2001) and Casella and Feinstein (2002) study how preferences for
public goods can endogenously become more heterogeneous as market size expands and
enables greater specialization. Bolton and Roland (1997) focus on income distribution and
nd that heterogeneous countries may break up if their barriers to external trade decline.
4Desmet et al. (2012) calibrate this trade-o¤ for European countries.
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Both these forces help explain why economic integration has been accompanied by political
fragmentation since World War II, but they cannot account for the opposite pattern during
the previous century.
Our work is also related to the literature on trade and war. The idea that trade promotes
peace was formalized by Polachek (1980). It is based on the premise that conict harms
trade and hence trade openness raises the opportunity cost of war (Alesina and Spolaore
2005; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2013). Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) show that
while bilateral trade lowers the probability of conict, multilateral trade openness decreases
dependence to any given country and hence the cost of a bilateral conict. The opposite
idea that trade generates military conict is instead expressed in neo-Marxist theories of
imperialism. Trade can also make countries dependent on others and therefore vulnerable
(Bonfatti and ORourke 2017). Our paper suggests that these seemingly antithetical views
can capture two di¤erent stages of the same model. In particular, we provide a unied
explanation for why territorial changes are more associated with military conict in the rst
wave of globalization than in the second. Consistent with our result that economic unions
remove the incentive to wage war, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2012) nd evidence that
regional trade agreements promote peaceful relations. The e¤ect of war on country formation
has instead been studied by, among others, Alesina and Spolaore (2005), Gennaioli and Voth
(2015) and Alesina, Reich and Riboni (2017).
More broadly, our research is related to the economic analysis of federalism and of the
geographic structure of government. Our model embeds the key trade-o¤ that lies at the
heart of the classic theory of scal federalism (Oates 1972). Centralization reaps economies
of scale and benets from policy coordination, but it imposes a uniform policy on localities
with di¤erent preferences. Political-economy frictions micro-found these countervailing forces
with remarkable generality (Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003; Harstad 2007; Bo¤a,
Piolatto and Ponzetto 2016). Multiple local governments fail to coordinate e¢ ciently even
if they can bargain with one another. A single central government fails to match policies to
local preferences even if it can di¤erentiate policy across regions in fact endogenous policy
di¤erentiation may prove more harmful than uniformity. Such models of political centraliza-
tion and decentralization have been applied most often to the architecture of government at
the sub-national level (Lockwood 2006; Treisman 2007). However, the same insights apply
to the study of international unions (Marks and Hooghe 2004; Alesina, Angeloni and Etro
2005; Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 2005; Ruta 2005).
Prior work has overwhelmingly focused on the optimal size and composition of an ex-
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ogenously given number of government tiers. Surprisingly, the literature has devoted much
less attention to the choice between a single-level and a multi-level governance structure,
which our analysis focuses on. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) present the fundamental trade-
o¤ between economies of scope and the benets of assigning di¤erent policy decisions to
jurisdictions of di¤erent size.5 Bo¤a, Piolatto and Ponzetto (2016) micro-found economies of
scope in political accountability and show that a federal structure is optimal only when there
is wide geographic variation in voter information. Our analysis advances this line of research
by studying how the incentives for multi-level governance change over time as globalization
increases.
2 The Symmetric World
In this section, we develop a stylized model of the world that contains the basic ingredients
of our theory: geography, markets and preferences. The model mixes these ingredients
imposing a high degree of symmetry. This allows us to derive our basic results on the e¤ects
of globalization on political structure quickly and intuitively.
The concept of locality is a key primitive in our theory. We model the world as a set
of places within which there are neither geographical nor cultural distances, and we label
them localities. Thus, localities consist of a group of people sharing common preferences and
inhabiting a particular territory. This approach, which is common in the literature, simplies
the study of how peoples with di¤erent preferences interact and organize themselves into
political entities. But it is silent about how these di¤erent preferences arose in the rst place
and how they evolve over time. It also abstracts from domestic conict.
The concept of globalization is another important primitive in our theory. Geographical
distances introduce trade costs across localities. In particular, we use the usual assumption
of iceberg trade costs across localities. We interpret globalization as exogenous technological
change that gradually removes these trade costs.
2.1 Basic Setup
We consider a world with a continuum of atomistic localities, l 2 [0; 1]. Each locality contains
a positive measure of identical individuals. Let Wl be the welfare of the representative
5Specically, Chapter 2 discusses arbitrarily overlapping jurisdictions and Chapter 9 a system constrained
to form a pyramidal hierarchy. However, most of the book focuses on the case of prohibitive economies of
scope, as in Alesina and Spolaore (1997).
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individual of locality l. For short, we refer to this individual as locality l. Then, the
welfare of locality l is determined as follows:
Wl = W
M
l +W
G
l , (1)
where WMl is the utility derived from the consumption of market goods, and W
G
l is the
utility derived from public services.
Governments provide public services and regulate markets, so government activity a¤ects
both welfare components. A political structure for this world consists of two partitions of
the set of localities [0; 1] into governments: a public-service partition P with typical element
Pn 2 P ; and an economic-regulation partition R with typical element Rn 2 R. We assume
a pyramidal hierarchy of governments. This means that, if the partitions P and R do not
coincide, the ner partition must be a renement of the coarser one.6
If P = R, we say that the world has a single-level governance structure, and we refer
to the common elements of P and R as country governments or countries. Each of these
countries provides both public services and market regulation to its constituent localities.
If P 6= R, we say that the world has a two-level governance structure. Since it will
become clear shortly that P is always a renement of R, we refer to the (smaller) elements
of P as country governments or countries, and the (larger) elements of R as economic unions
or unions. Countries provide public services to their constituent localities, while unions
regulate the markets of their constituent countries.
Our goal is to construct a model of the partitions P and R, that is, a model of how
localities organize themselves into countries and how countries organize themselves into
unions. To do this, we need to make assumptions about preferences, technology and the
costs of government and determine how welfare Wl depends on political structure (P;R).
2.1.1 Markets and Trade
There is a continuum of industries producing goods, i 2 [0; 1]. Let cl (i) be the consumption
of goods of industry i by locality l. The utility function takes the following form:
WMl =
Z 1
0
ln cl (i) di. (2)
6This assumption simplies the presentation, but it is not needed until Section 5. The equilibria discussed
in Sections 3 and 4 have this property even if we do not impose it.
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The choice of a symmetric logarithmic or Cobb-Douglas utility function ensures that all
localities spend the same share of their income on each industry.
The production of consumption goods requires di¤erentiated input varieties, m 2 [0; 1].
Dene cl (m; i) as the amount of inputs of the variety m used by locality l in the production
of goods in industry i. Then, we have that:
cl (i) = exp
Z 1
0
ln cl (m; i) dm

. (3)
This production function is symmetric across and within industries. Since we use again the
convenient Cobb-Douglas formulation, each locality spends the same fraction of its income
on all varieties of all industries.
To introduce gains from specialization and trade, we use a simple symmetric version of
the Ricardian model. Each locality is endowed with one unit of labor in each industry. This
unit can produce one unit of the variety with the same index as the locality (m = l); or e 
units of any other variety (m 6= l). Since  > 0, each locality has a technological advantage
in its ownvariety. The parameter  measures the extent to which technologies di¤er across
localities and, therefore, the potential gains from specialization and trade.
There are technological barriers to trade. We assume uniform iceberg transportation
costs across localities so that only a fraction e  < 1 of the goods shipped from l to m 6= l
arrives to destination. To focus on the most interesting case in which trade costs are not
prohibitive and to ensure positive gains from trade, we assume that  >  > 0. Our measure
of globalization is the wedge       , which captures the potential gains from trade
and increases as improvements in transportation technology reduce physical trade costs  .
Globalization can thus range from  = 0 when trade costs are prohibitive ( = ) to a
maximum of  =  when trade costs are nil ( = 0).
Policy-induced barriers to trade or border e¤ects arise when di¤erent governments reg-
ulate markets. In particular, we assume that exchanging goods in a fraction  2 (0; 1) of
industries requires legal enforcement of contracts. In these industries, varieties cannot be
traded between localities that have di¤erent governments regulating their markets, because
they belong to di¤erent elements Rn and Rn0 . The reason is that foreigners correctly antic-
ipate that domestic courts will discriminate against them ex post. In the remaining set of
industries, contracts are self-enforcing and hence varieties can be traded without restrictions.
This formulation captures a simple and yet realistic microfoundation for the well-known nd-
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ing that borders obstruct trade.7
A market equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities such that individuals maximize
utility and markets clear. Appendix A.2 shows that there exists a unique market equilibrium.
Traded industries specialize in each localitys input variety, export essentially all of their
production and import the remaining input varieties. Thus, consumption in traded industries
is cl (m; i) = e  . Nontraded industries are forced to produce locally all input varieties. Thus,
consumption in nontraded industries is cl (m; i) = e . This implies the following utility from
consuming market goods:
WMl =   + 

1   + 
Z 1
0
IRl=mdm

, (4)
where IRl=m is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if localities l and m belong to the
same Rn, and zero otherwise. Equation (4) shows the impact of border e¤ects. A decline
in transportation costs raises the gains from trade  in every industry. However, border
e¤ects prevent a locality from reaping the gains from trade in a mass  of industries that
require contract enforcement. As a consequence, the value of removing each border e¤ect is
proportional to , where  measures the potential gains from trade in any single industry
and  the mass of industries subject to border e¤ects. This result is intuitive and plays an
important role in our analysis.
2.1.2 Governments
Public services consist of a basket of di¤erentiated varieties, x 2 [0; 1]. The basket provided
to locality l is characterized by a density function gl (x) dened over these varieties, with
gl (x)  0 and
R 1
0
gl (x) dx = 1. The utility derived from these public services is given by:
WGl =
Z 1
0
l (x)u (gl (x)) dx K (5)
where l (x)  0, u (gl (x)) =  1=gl (x) and K is a cost function to de dened shortly. We
refer to the rst and second terms of Equation (5) as the benets and costs of public services
respectively.
We now introduce three assumptions about governments. The rst assumption is about
7There are other microfoundations, of course. For instance, tari¤s and non-tari¤ barriers are also policies
that discriminate against foreigners and limit the range of goods that can be traded.
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preference heterogeneity. Each locality has a di¤erent ideal variety of public services. We
dene and order the basic varieties such that the ideal one for locality l is x = l. In particular,
we assume that l (x) =  if x = l; and l (x) = 0 otherwise.
The second assumption is that there are economies of scale in the provision of public
services. Building and maintaining a government reduces the value or utility of public services
by a total or xed amount  > 0, and this cost is equally shared among the constituent
localities.
The third and nal assumption is that there are economies of scope across government
functions. Membership of an economic union reduces the value or utility of public services
by an amount  > 0. This captures the costs of oversight and coordination between the
country and the economic union.
These three assumptions imply the following utility from public services:
WGl =  

gl (l)
  R 1
0
IPl=mdm
  IUl , (6)
where  > 0; IPl=m is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if if localities l and m belong
to the same Pn, and zero otherwise; and IUl is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if
locality l is a member of an economic union Rn 6= Pn, and zero otherwise. The rst term in
Equation (6) says that the value of public services for locality l depends on the amount of
its ideal variety that is provided. The second term in Equation (6) says that each localitys
share of the xed cost of government declines with the size of the country. The parameter
 measures the magnitude of these economies of scale. The third term of Equation (6) says
that being member of an economic union is costly. The parameter  measures the magnitude
of these economies of scope.
2.2 Discussion of Assumptions
To complete the model we need to make assumptions on how localities interact. We shall
consider law and diplomacy in Section 3, and war and conquest in Section 4. In both cases,
the worlds political structure is determined by the interplay of the forces that we have
already presented. Our assumptions are commonly made in the literature, but it may be
useful to take a small detour and discuss them before we move on.
The starting point of our analysis is the idea that improvements in transportation tech-
nology are a major driver of globalization, which we model as a fall in trade costs between
localities. This view is uncontroversial: there is overwhelming evidence that the secular rise
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in trade volumes was made possible by better transportation technologies. For instance,
some of the major drivers of the rst wave of globalization are the adoption of the steamship
(Pascali 2017), the telegraph (Steinwender 2017) and the spread of railroads (Donaldson
2017). Likewise, the main drivers of the second wave of globalization include the use of
containerization in ocean shipping (Levinson 2006), the development of jet aircraft engines
(Hummels 2007) and more recently the ICT revolution. All these innovations promoted
trade both between and within countries.
We also assume that borders obstruct trade. The large negative e¤ect of political borders
on trade volumes is well know at least since the work of McCallum (1995), who showed that,
controlling for distance and income, trade between two Canadian provinces is 20 times larger
than trade between a Canadian province and a U.S. state. While the exact magnitude of the
border e¤ect is still subject to debate, all existing studies coincide in nding large e¤ects.
For instance, in a recent survey of the voluminous empirical literature on gravity equations,
Head and Mayer (2014) report that countries are typically found to trade 5 to 7 times more
with themselves than with any other country.
There is equally strong evidence that sharing economic regulations and signing economic
agreements promote trade and reduce the border e¤ect. For instance, Head and Mayer
(2014) also report that sharing a common currency or being part of a free trade area are
associated on average with a doubling of the volume of trade; similarly, Helpman et al.
(2008) nd that having a similar legal system increases the bilateral volume of trade by
more than 60 percent. Using a simple model, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) attempt a
rough decomposition of the border e¤ect. They argue that the compounded cost of borders is
equivalent to an ad valorem tax of 44 percent, which can be broken down into an 8 percent of
policy related barriers (including non-tari¤ barriers), 7 percent language barriers, 14 percent
currency barriers, 6 percent information cost barriers, and 3 percent security barriers.
Our modeling assumption that technological barriers reduce trade along the intensive
margin while policy-induced barriers a¤ect the extensive margin is also grounded in empirical
evidence. There is a wide consensus that transportation costs a¤ect signicantly the intensive
margin of trade; on the other hand, Helpman et al. (2008) and Dutt et al. (2013) nd that
free trade agreements and WTO membership predominantly a¤ect the extensive margin.
Turning next to governments, our model follows the standard assumptions that under-
pin the literature on federalism and the architecture of government since Oates (1972).
Having separate local governments enables better preference matching, but sharing a com-
mon government enables benecial policy coordination and reaps economies of scale. While
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these assumptions originated as simple observations of real-world patterns, models of po-
litical economy have provided them with rigorous micro-foundations. Majority rule makes
centralization costly when localities have di¤erent preferences (Lockwood 2002; Besley and
Coate 2003). Frictions in bargaining between political leaders (Harstad 2007) and in their
agency relationship to their constituents (Bo¤a, Piolatto and Ponzetto 2016) explain both
why multiple local government cannot fully coordinate their policies and why a single central
government cannot fully tailor public services to local preferences. Accordingly, Strumpf and
Oberholzer-Gee (2002) nd empirically that U.S. states with more heterogeneous preferences
are more likely to decentralize policy-making.
Our assumption of economies of scope in government is equally classic (Musgrave 1971;
Dahl and Tufte 1973; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Marks and Hooghe (2004, p. 18) em-
phasize the costs of decomposing authority as a paramount concern in the analysis of
multi-level governance, especially in the international arena with its prevalence of intersect-
ing task-specic jurisdictions. Empirical evidence shows that multiplying administrative
tiers reduces their e¢ ciency, and is particularly associated with lower labor productivity and
excess government employment (Le Galès and John 1997; Andrews and Boyne 2009). This
cost is particularly pronounced for special-purpose governments in charge of a single task
(Berry 2009). These e¢ ciency losses reect both the costs of administrative duplication and
economies of scope in political accountability. Bo¤a, Piolatto and Ponzetto (2016) show the-
oretically that dividing policy-making responsibilities across multiple levels of government
increases overall rent extraction by government o¢ cials. Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) re-
port that across countries corruption increases with the number of administrative tiers: as
they rise from two to six, the probability of a rm reporting that it is never expected to pay
bribes falls by 32 percentage points.8
3 Law and Diplomacy
To determine the equilibrium political structure (P;R), we must make assumptions about
how governments are chosen. A natural benchmark is that bargaining among localities
is e¢ cient and delivers Pareto e¢ cient outcomes. In this case, the equilibrium political
8Admittedly, the evidence about the importance of economies of scope has been gathered mostly at the
sub-national level. Casual observation suggests, however, that economies of scope also apply at the supra-
national level. A notorious example is the European Central Bank, which is aimed at reducing the border
e¤ect by eliminating currency barriers. Its creation does not seem to have reduced the size or costs of national
central banks, but instead it seems to have just added to these costs.
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structure is obtained by solving the following maximization problem:
(P;R) = arg max
Z 1
0
!lWldl, (7)
where f!lgl2[0;1] is a set of Pareto weights such that
R 1
0
!ldl = 1. Given the symmetry of
this world, it seems reasonable to focus on the case in which the bargaining process treats
all localities in the same way: !l = 1 for all l 2 [0; 1]. Sometimes this political structure is
referred to as the utilitarian welfare optimum since it maximizes average world welfare. We
view it as the description of a world in which all localities have the right to choose their own
political structure. This is a world ruled by law and diplomacy. We shall consider war and
conquest in the next section.
An implication of the maximization problem (7) is that each country Pn provides a
uniform bundle that contains equal amounts of the ideal varieties of its constituent localities.9
That is, locality l receives the following bundle of public services:
gl (x) =
8><>:
1R 1
0
IPl=mdm
if IPl=x = 1
0 if IPl=x = 0.
(8)
Thus, we can re-write Equation (6) as follows:
WGl =  
Z 1
0
IPl=mdm 
R 1
0
IPl=mdm
  IUl , (9)
Note that the value of public services for locality l declines with the size of the country.
As more localities join the country, the public services provided are farther away from the
ideal of each member locality. The parameter  measures the importance of this preference
mismatch.
Combining Equations (1), (4), and (9), we obtain:
Wl =   + 

1   + 
Z 1
0
IRl=mdm

  
Z 1
0
IPl=mdm 
R 1
0
IPl=mdm
  IUl . (10)
Equation (10) shows how political structure determines welfare and reveals the key trade-o¤
that underlies our theory. A desirable political structure should facilitate trade, accommo-
9This is welfare-maximizing for the government given that localities have convex preferences.
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date preference heterogeneity and take advantage of economies of scale and scope. But these
goals cannot be achieved simultaneously and something must give.10
3.1 Equilibrium Political Structure
There are a couple of preliminary results that simplify the analysis of the maximization
problem (7). The rst one is that P and R contain equal-sized elements. Let S and U be the
sizes of each element Pn 2 P andRn 2 R respectively.11 The second result is the conrmation
that, indeed, P is a renement of R. If it is ever worth paying the costs of having a two-
level governance structure, this is because localities desire a lower-level government that
provides public services adapted to their specic preferences, and a higher-level government
that reduces border e¤ects and facilitates trade. Thus, we can write Wl as a function of S
and U as follows:
Wl = W
F (S; U) =   +  (1   + U)  S   
S
  IU , (11)
where IU is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if S 6= U , and zero otherwise.
It follows from Equation (11) that the equilibrium political structure that solves the
maximization problem (7) is such that either P = R or P 6= R = f[0; 1]g.12 In the rst
case, the world is organized in a single-level governance structure with a set of countries that
provide public services and regulate markets. In the second case, the world is organized in a
two-level governance structure with countries providing public services and a world economic
union regulating markets.
We now nd the equilibrium political structure in three steps. First, we compute the wel-
fare W F (S1 ; S

1) generated by the single-level governance structure, where S

1 is the optimal
country size without a world union. This political structure takes full advantage of economies
10Equation (10) includes all the features of Oatess (1972) classic Decentralization Theorem: in the absence
of cost savings from the centralized provision of public services ( = 0) and of interjurisdictional externalities
( = 0), welfare is at least as high if each locality can choose its own public services than if any uniform
bundle is imposed across all of them.
11Throughout, we disregard the constraint that the number of countries and unions, 1=S and 1=U , must
be a natural number. Aside from this constraint, all localities prefer the same optimal country size so
that any equilibrium is symmetric. In Appendix A.3 we introduce this integer constraint and show that the
equilibrium political strcuture remains symmetric and qualitatively analogous to the tractable approximation
we use in the main text.
12We know that, if P 6= R, there is only one world economic union because the marginal cost of adding
members is constant and the marginal benet is growing with the size of the union. Thus, having many
small unions is not optimal.
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of scope, and country size trades o¤preference heterogeneity against both economies of scale
and facilitating trade:
S1 =
s

    . (12)
The size of countries in the absence of unions is increasing with economies of scale () and
the importance of trade (), and it is decreasing with preference heterogeneity ().13
Second, we compute the welfareW F (S2 ; 1) generated by a world with an economic union,
where S2 is the optimal country size with a world union. This political structure gives up
economies of scope in order to remove border e¤ects and facilitate trade. Country size trades
o¤ preference heterogeneity and economies of scale:
S2 =
r


. (13)
The size of countries with a world union is increasing with economies of scale () and it is
decreasing with preference heterogeneity (). Country size is always smaller with a world
union than without it. The reason is that the union removes one of the incentives for country
size, namely, facilitating trade.
The third step is to determine the equilibrium political structure. If W F (S1 ; S

1) >
W F (S2 ; 1), the world is partitioned into countries of size S

1 . If instead W
F (S1 ; S

1) <
W F (S2 ; 1), the world is partitioned into countries of size S

2 that belong to a world economic
union. Naturally, in the knife-edge case in which W F (S1 ; S

1) = W
F (S2 ; 1), both solutions
are equilibrium political structures. A little bit of algebra shows that the world union is
preferred if and only if:
+ 2
p
 <  + 2
p
 (   ). (14)
That is, the world union is preferred for high values of ,  and ; and low values of  and
. A world union is more useful if the border e¤ect and the gains from trade are large and
there is substantial preference heterogeneity. A world union is less useful if economies of
scale and scope are sizable.
13Equation (12) assumes that  > + , so that there is enough preference heterogeneity to ensure that
countries are always smaller than the whole world.
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Figure 4: Globalization and Political Structure. The gure shows how equilibrium political
structure depends on economies of scope () and globalization ().
3.2 Globalization and Political Structure
With these results at hand, we can now return to Figures 1 and 2 in the introduction and
ask again: Why did the rst wave of globalization reduce the number of countries but not
generate economic unions? Why did the second wave of globalization increase the number
of countries and lead to the creation of economic unions? To answer these questions, we
interpret globalization as a process by which  grows from 0 to , and we study how political
structure changes as this process unfolds.
Figure 4 shows how equilibrium political structure depends on the two key parameters
that measure economies of scope and globalization,  and . For a given , the world chooses
a single-level political structure if  is low. If  is not too large, as in the dashed line, the world
political structure shifts from single-level to two-level governance as globalization crosses a
threshold value U dened as follows:
U + 2
p
 (   U) = + 2
p
. (15)
If economies of scope are nil, the smallest gain from trade leads to the formation of a world
union ( = 0 implies U = 0). If economies of scope are prohibitive, the world union is never
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Figure 5: Globalization, Countries and Unions. The gure shows how the world political
structure changes with globalization (). The black line is the size of each country, the green
line is the world union.
an equilibrium ( >  + 2
p
 (   )   2p implies U > ). The comparative statics
of this threshold follow directly from our analysis of Equation (14). The larger the border
e¤ect () and preference heterogeneity (), the smaller U . The larger economies of scale
() and scope (), the larger U .
Figure 5 shows how political structure changes with globalization by plotting the equilib-
rium size of countries and unions as a function of . At low levels of globalization ( < U),
it is too expensive to create a world union, and increases in  lead to an increase in country
size. The cost of reaping additional gains from trade is a growing preference mismatch.
Eventually, the preference mismatch has grown so large that it becomes cost-e¤ective to
create a world union. At high levels of globalization ( > U), the cost of reaping additional
gains from trade is the loss of economies of scope. The creation of a world union allows
countries to revert to a smaller size and reduce the preference mismatch. Further increases
in  have no e¤ect on political structure.
It is instructive to compare our result to the nding by Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg
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(2000) that globalization always reduces country size. Their analysis di¤ers from ours in two
crucial ways. First, they assume prohibitive economies of scope so that the world always
has single-level governance. Second, they model globalization as an exogenous reduction in
the border e¤ect. Thus, globalization always reduces country size, and their model cannot
explain why globalization led to smaller countries in the twentieth century but not in the
nineteenth century. We show, however, that an exogenous decline in transportation costs
increases the border e¤ect in the nineteenth century, and then leads to the endogenous
removal of border e¤ects in the twentieth century. This is how we explain the reversal in the
link between globalization and country size.14
4 War and Conquest
The previous section considered a world in which every locality can choose its own govern-
ment freely. Then, the equilibrium political structure is the outcome of e¢ cient bargaining
among equals. This constitutes a useful theoretical benchmark and an ideal state of a¤airs.
But it hardly reects historical experience. Alongside diplomacy, war and conquest (or the
threat of it) have played a crucial role in shaping real-world political structure. Thus, we
want to know whether the possibility of war and conquest a¤ects the relationship between
globalization and political structure. And if it does, we also want to know how and why this
happens.
Suppose now that the world is divided into core and periphery. The core contains a
measure  of localities with a superior military technology that can be used to conquer other
localities and form empires. The periphery contains the remaining localities that do not
have this military technology. We assign low indices to core localities: C = [0; ]. We keep
all assumptions regarding preferences, technology and the costs of government. Thus, the
model of the previous section applies as  ! 0.
Empires are an alternative form of government that provides public services and regulates
the markets of all its member localities. The latter are divided into the metropolis and the
colonies. The metropolis contains core localities that unite to conquer periphery localities
that then become colonies. Empires provide in identical amounts the ideal public services of
localities in their metropolises. If locality l belongs to a metropolis, it receives the following
14Could it be technological progress? Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) show that technological
progress increases the gains from trade and the incentives to create large countries. Once again, the di¢ culty
lies in the reversal of the link between technological progress and country size. Their model cannot explain
why technological progress led to larger countries in the nineteenth century but not in the twentieth century.
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bundle of public services:
gl (x) =
8><>:
1R 1
0
IMl=mdm
if IMl=m = 1
0 if IMl=m = 0,
(16)
where IMl=m is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if localities l and m belong to the same
metropolis and zero otherwise. Note that empires provide none of the ideal public services
of their colonies.
To build an empire of size E, core localities build a metropolis, and then wage war to
conquer the colonies. A colonial war is successful if and only if the size of the metropolis M
is large enough relative to that of the colonies:
M  E. (17)
The parameter  2 (0; 1) denes the smallest size of a successful metropolis. To simplify
matters, we assume throughout that  < . This means that the combined size of all empires
is always smaller than the world, and empires do not need to ght each other for colonies.
From the perspective of the metropolis, the upside of building an empire is that it fa-
cilitates trade and generates economies of scale with minimal preference mismatch. The
downside is that waging war and holding the empire together reduces the utility that the
metropolis derives from public services by an amount ! > 0. This cost captures the diversion
of government resources from providing public services in the metropolis to waging colonial
wars. Thus, the welfare of a member of the metropolis is given by:
Wl =   + 

1   + 
Z 1
0
IEl=mdm

  
Z 1
0
IMl=mdm 
R 1
0
IEl=mdm
  !, (18)
where IEl=m is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if localities l and m belong to the same
empire and zero otherwise.
4.1 Equilibrium Political Structure
In an asymmetric world that features war and imperial conquest, equilibrium political struc-
ture need no longer be globally e¢ cient, because core localities can impose their will on
other localities through aggression. However, we still assume that political structure is
jointly e¢ cient for the core. That is, we allow core localities to cooperate with each other on
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the creation of their respective empires.15 Formally, equilibrium political structure is now
determined in two stages:
1. Core localities choose cooperatively whether to wage war and build empires. Localities
in the periphery might become their colonies or remain free.
2. Localities that do not belong to an empire choose their political structure through
e¢ cient bargaining, as in our baseline model.
The worlds equilibrium political structure now consists of a set of empires that have a
combined size 1 F ; plus two partitions (P;R) of the free world which itself has a combined
size F . We solve for this equilibrium political structure in two steps. First, we determine
the political structure of the free world (P;R) for a given size F . Second, we determine the
number and size of empires and therefore the size of the free world F .
One interpretation of the model in the previous section is that the set of core localities
with superior military technology is very small: i.e.  ! 0. Another interpretation is that
the military technology is not good enough, i.e., ! and  are large. As we shall see shortly,
in both cases the whole world is free and diplomacy rules.
4.1.1 The Free World
The analysis of the free world is essentially the same as in the previous section. The only
di¤erence is that now the combined size of the free world is F rather than 1. E¢ cient
bargaining ensures that free localities choose the optimal political structure. Equation (11)
still applies and, as a result, there are two cases to consider: S = U and S < U = F . The
optimal country sizes in these cases are still given by Equations (12) and (13), respectively.16
The union of the free world is preferred now if and only if:
+ 2
p
  F + 2
p
 (   ). (19)
Condition (19) generalizes Condition (14) for the case of a free world of size F . The main
di¤erence is that empires reduce the size of the free world, and this reduces the welfare
associated with an economic union of free localities. This union still costs  to each member.
But it is now less e¢ cient at removing border e¤ects, F instead of .
15Historically, great powers have in fact cooperated and agreed on explicit partitions of the world, from
the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 to the Berlin Conference in 1884.
16We now assume that  > F 2 +  to ensure that countries are always smaller than the free world.
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4.1.2 Empires
Core localities must rst decide whether to wage war to build an empire or to forego war
and enter the free world. We start the analysis with two observations. The rst is that
the equilibrium political structure features symmetric empires. Let E be the size of each of
them. The second observation is that constraint (17) is always binding. From the perspec-
tive of the metropolis, there is no reason not to add additional colonies. This lowers the
cost of government and facilitates trade without creating any preference mismatch (for the
metropolis) in the provision of public services.
These two observations imply that the welfare of a core locality that builds an empire is
given by:
Wl = W
E (E) =   +  (1   + E)  E   
E
  !. (20)
Note that this welfare does not depend on what other core localities do. This follows from
our assumption that  < , which ensures that core localities can nd their desired measure
of colonies without having to ght each other. The size of the empire trades o¤ preference
heterogeneity against both economies of scale and facilitating trade:
E =
s

   , (21)
where E is the optimal empire size (for the the core localities).17
Comparing Equation (21) to Equations (12) and (13), it is immediate to see that empires
are larger than peaceful countries. The reason is that the metropolis does not internalize
the cost of the preference mismatch imposed on the colonies: hence,  appears instead of
 in the denominator. The equilibrium size of empires is increasing with economies of scale
() and the importance of trade (), and it is decreasing with preference heterogeneity ().
These comparative statics are the same as for countries. Also, we now have the additional
result that the smaller the size of the metropolis relative to that of the colonies (), the
larger the empire.
When are empires formed? If core localities wage war and build empires, their welfare
is WE (E). If core localities instead agree to refrain from waging war and choose to form
countries and unions by e¢ cient bargaining, their welfare is max

W F (S1 ; S

1) ;W
F (S2 ; 1)
	
.
IfWE (E) < max

W F (S1 ; S

1) ;W
F (S2 ; 1)
	
, there are no empires, diplomacy rules and the
17Equation (21) assumes that  > +, so that there is enough preference heterogeneity to ensure that
the empire is smaller than the whole world.
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size of the free world is F = 1. If instead WE (E) > max

W F (S1 ; S

1) ;W
F (S2 ; 1)
	
, there
are = (E) empires of size E, and the size of the free world is reduced to F = 1  =.18
Some algebra shows that empires are built if:
! +  + 2
p
 (  )  min
n
 + 2
p
 (   ); + 2
p

o
. (22)
Not surprisingly, empires are built in equilibrium if the military technology is good enough,
i.e., the cost of waging war (!) is low and the metropolis () small relative to the empire.
To sum up, the introduction of war and conquest substantially enriches the set of possible
equilibrium structures. Condition (22) determines whether empires are built or not, and
thus the size of the free world. Then, Condition (19) determines whether the free world is
organized in a single-level governance structure or a two-level one.
4.2 Globalization and Political Structure
Let us now return to the question of how globalization a¤ects political structure that mo-
tivates our analysis. To do this, we consider again a sequence of equilibria indexed by ,
and explore how political structure changes as  grows from 0 to . Recall that, in the
baseline model of the previous section, there is a threshold value U such that the world
political structure will consist of a single-level governance at early stages of globalization
( < U), and then shifts to the two-level governance at later stages ( > U). How does
the introduction of war and conquest a¤ect this result?
Figure 6 shows again how equilibrium political structure depends on the two key para-
meters that measure economies of scope and globalization, i.e.  and . Unlike Figure 4, we
assume now that the cost of war is low enough so that empire-building is an equilibrium for
some parameter values. The rst new result is that there is an age of empires if and only if
the following condition holds:
! < 2
p

p
   U  
p
  U

. (23)
18We see here the role played by the assumption that core localities cooperate. If core locali-
ties choose empires noncooperatively, there might be equilibria in which empires are formed when
max

WF (S1 ; S

1 ) ;W
F (S2 ; 1)
	
> WE (E) > max

WF (S1 ; S

1 ) ;W
F (S2 ; 1  =)
	
. If core localities
expect other core localities to build empires, their best response is to build an empire themselves. And, once
this happens, there is no incentive to deviate. This equilibrium is a coordination failure since it lowers the
welfare of all the localities in the world. One can also construct equilibria with mixed strategies in which
some core localities build empires and others do not. We ignore theses complications to simplify our analysis.
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Figure 6: Globalization and Political Structure. The gure shows how equilibrium political
structure depends on economies of scope () and globalization ().
Otherwise, empires are never built and the e¤ects of globalization are those of the previous
model. The second result is that, if there is an age of empires, it must start when the world
has a single-level governance structure. The third result is that, if the age of empires comes
to an end, it must give way to a world with a two-level governance structure.
The dashed line in Figure 6 corresponds to a case in which initially the whole world is
free and there is no economic union. As globalization reaches a rst threshold value L > 0,
empires are formed. Eventually, as globalization reaches a a second threshold value H < ,
empires are abandoned and a world economic union is formed. This evolution is not generic,
though. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for L > 0 is that:
! + 2
p
 > 2
p
. (24)
This condition implies that core localities do not wish to conquer colonies merely to compel
them to defray the xed cost of government. The motivation for imperial expansion lies
instead in the desire to gain access to colonial markets without having to compromise the
preferences of the metropolis over public services. As a consequence, core localities choose
to forego warfare in autarky, when market access is worthless.
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Also, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for H <  is that:
! + 2
p
 (  ) >    + 2
p
. (25)
This condition implies that even though empires limit the preference mismatch in the
metropolis, there is a level of globalization at which this mismatch has grown large enough
to justify a move to the two-level governance structure. Paradoxically, the cause of imperial
collapse at a late stage of globalization is exactly the same as the cause for the rise of empires
at an early stage, namely, the desire to remove border e¤ects and reap the gains from trade.
It is just that, at some point, it becomes more cost-e¢ cient to replace conquered colonies
with free partners in an economic union.19
Figure 7 depicts this three-stage evolution of the world political structure by plotting
the equilibrium size of empires, free countries, and unions. At low levels of globalization
( < L), the world contains only free countries. There are no empires or unions. As
globalization proceeds, the size of countries grows and so does the preference mismatch.
When globalization crosses the rst threshold (L <  < H), the preference mismatch has
grown too large and core localities prefer to build empires. War allows the metropolises
to impose their ideal public services on their colonies. Thus, empires facilitate trade and
generate economies of scale at the cost of an unbounded preference mismatch in the colonies.
Empires are larger than countries and keep growing as globalization proceeds. Eventually,
globalization crosses the second threshold ( > H). At this point, preference mismatch has
grown too large even within empires. Empires collapse and countries revert to a smaller size.
A world union is created. After this, there are no further changes in political structure.20
The analysis in this section has shown that war and conquest do not overturn our main
result that globalization generates a shift in the world political structure from a single-level
governance structure to a two-level one. On the contrary, considering war and conquest
alongside diplomacy strengthens and enriches our theory of the link between globalization
19To simplify the analysis, we have ruled out by assumption the possibility that empires form economic
unions. Yet, under mild assumptions, this can be obtained as a result. For example, suppose that core
localities can impose their preferred political structure, including economic unions, onto the rest of the
world. Then, under the condition ! > 2
p
(1   p), it is easy to show that core localities would strictly
prefer diplomacy than war both in autarky and when the world union is in place. Hence, economic unions
will be peaceful.
20Figure 7 depicts the case in which, during the age of empires, the free world always adopts a single-
level governance structure and the shift to the two-level governance structure coincides with the collapse of
empires. This need not be the case. If the size of the free world is large enough, an economic union of free
countries co-exists with empires.
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Figure 7: Countries, Empires and Unions. The gure shows how the world political structure
changes with globalization (). The black line is the size of peaceful countries, the red line
is the size of empires, the green line is the world union.
and political structure. It explains why changes in political structure are associated with
conict and aggression during the rst wave of globalization, when empires are created and
expand. It also explains why changes in political structure are peaceful during the second
wave of globalization, when economic unions are formed.
5 Geography
The world so far lies in an abstract space in which all localities are equidistant. In reality,
geography is much more complex. The world is made of continents and regions, and more
proximate areas tend to be more integrated, both economically and politically. Geography
has historically played an important role in determining political structure, and it seems
reasonable to ask how it a¤ects our results so far.
We assume now that, in addition to sharing a superior military technology, core localities
are also near each other in a geographical sense. Periphery localities are instead far away
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from the core and from each other. Besides the added realism, this simple extension helps
us rationalize why the shift from the single-level to the two-level governance structure tends
to be gradual and may start at the regional level.
Iceberg transportation costs for core-periphery and periphery-periphery trade remain  ,
as before. Thus, the gains from this type of trade are still . But we assume now that iceberg
transportation costs for core-core trade are    , with  > 0. This implies that the gains
from this type of trade are now  + . The rest of assumptions are those of the previous
section. Thus, the previous model applies as ! 0.
The main implication of this generalization of our model is that the utility derived from
the consumption of market goods now depends on whether the locality is located in the core
or the periphery:
WMl =   + 

1   + 
Z 1
0
IRl=mdm

+ Il2C

(1  )  + 
Z 
0
IRl=mdm

, (26)
where Il2C is an indicator variable that equals 1 if l 2 C and zero otherwise. Notice that
border e¤ects are larger for core-core trade,  ( + ), than for either core-periphery or
periphery-periphery trade, . It follows immediately that, other things equal, core localities
prefer sharing economic regulation with other core localities. Periphery localities, instead,
are indi¤erent about which localities they share regulation with, and care only about their
total number.
5.1 Equilibrium Political Structure
As in the previous section, the equilibrium political structure is determined in two stages.
First, we nd the political structure for the free world for a given F . Second, we determine
the number and size of empires. Appendix A.4 goes through these steps in detail. In the
main text, we simply describe our new results.
The rst one is that the partitions P and R need no longer contain equal-sized elements.
Since core localities prefer to join other core localities there are two distinct types of elements
of P : core countries (formed by core localities) with size SC , and periphery countries (formed
by periphery localities) with size SP . If P 6= R, there are, at most, two distinct types of
elements of R: core unions (formed by core countries) with size UC , and periphery unions
(formed by periphery countries) with size UP .
The second, and most important, new result is that now the free world has three possible
equilibrium political structures. The rst is a single-level governance structure with only
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countries: UC = SC and UP = SP . In this case, core countries are larger. The reason, of
course, is that they have larger gains from trade. The second political structure is a two-level
governance with a world economic union. In this case, the size of all countries is still given
by Equation (13). There is now a third possible political structure with an economic union
that includes only the core: UC =  and UP = SP .21 Thus, the world may adopt a mixed
political structure with two-level governance in the core and single-level governance in the
periphery. In this case, core countries are smaller than periphery countries. The reason,
which is familiar by now, is that the core union removes one incentive to increase country
size, which is to facilitate trade.
5.2 Globalization and Political Structure
We now go back to the question of how globalization a¤ects political structure, and we
consider again a sequence of equilibria indexed by . We begin with a scenario in which
waging war has prohibitive costs, so diplomacy always prevails and the world adopts the
welfare-maximizing political structure.
Figure 8 shows how this optimal political structure depends on the two key parameters
 and . As in Section 3, if economies of scope are high and globalization is modest the
optimal political structure is single-level governance; as globalization advances, the optimal
political structure shifts to two-level governance with a world union. The main novelty here
is that, if  is low enough relative to  and , there is an intermediate stage in which there
is a core union.
The dashed line in Figure 8 depicts such a three-stage evolution of the world political
structure. At low levels of globalization ( < C), the world contains only countries. As
globalization proceeds, the size of countries grows and so does the preference mismatch.
When globalization crosses a rst threshold, the preference mismatch has grown too large
for core localities and it justies giving up economies of scope. The preference mismatch
in periphery localities is still small and it does not justify the loss of economies of scope.
Thus, a core union becomes the cost-e¤ective choice. Intuitively, its optimality requires
that su¢ ciently small economies of scale, a su¢ ciently large core, and high enough gains
21Up to this point, the assumption of a pyramidal hierarchy of governments has eased the exposition,
allowing us to refer to countries and unions from the outset, but it has not been binding. Here, however, this
assumption has bite. Once a core union exists, core localities would prefer to form countries with periphery
localities, since this would facilitate additional trade. The assumption rules out this possibility. This does
not seem too outlandish, though, as it can be interpreted as another form of economies of scope.
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Figure 8: Globalization and Political Structure. The gure shows how equilibrium political
structure depends on economies of scope () and globalization ().
from core-core trade.22 Eventually, globalization crosses a second threshold. At this point,
preference mismatch has grown too large even in the periphery. The core union is enlarged
to include periphery countries and becomes a world union. After this, there are no further
changes in political structure.
As in Section 4, this peaceful evolution of political structure can be interrupted by a
period of imperialist aggression if the cost of war is low enough. Figure 9 displays the
equilibrium political structure in this general case. The dashed line corresponds to a scenario
in which globalization triggers a four-fold evolution. The rst stage is peaceful single-level
governance. The second is the creation of colonial empires through which the core conquers
and rules distant localities in the periphery. As globalization proceeds further, empires
become overstretched and collapse, and a peaceful union replaces them. The novelty is that,
in the third stage, this is a core union only. Bellicose global empires are initially replaced
by a peaceful regional union. Only as globalization progresses further is the fourth and nal
stage reached in which the whole world forms an economic union.
It is not di¢ cult to see that this core-periphery model could be extended in fruitful
22Formally, as we prove in Appendix A.4, the three lines in the graph shift up as  and  increase. They
also shift up as  increases, raising the economic benet of common regulation for the core; and as  increases
and  decreases, raising the benets and lowering the costs of small countries within the core union.
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Figure 9: Globalization and Political Structure. The gure shows how equilibrium political
structure depends on economies of scope () and globalization ().
ways. One possibility would be to assume that there are two, three or N peripheries that
are located progressively farther away. In this case, there would be a union that starts at
the core and grows outwardly with globalization. When the rst periphery joins the union,
the size of its countries declines. When the second periphery joins the union, the size of its
countries also declines. And so on. The union gradually advances outwardly, and it keeps
breaking up countries. The end point would be the same as before, but we would now have
more gradualism.
Another extension is to assume that the world has two core-periphery structures, which
we can think of as continents or regions. As globalization proceeds, within each region there
is a union that advances gradually, breaking up countries. Across regions, however, there is
no union. Eventually, globalization has gone so far that a world union becomes cost-e¤ective,
and the two regional unions merge. Once again, the world reaches the same end point, but
now we have both gradualism and regionalism.
6 An Interpretation of Historical Experience
We conclude by using our analytical results to attempt a suggestive narrative of the political
evolution of modern Europe (and the world).
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Figure 10: Europe after the Congress of Vienna (1815)
European History Since the late Middle Ages, European sovereign states on average grew
in size until the end of the nineteenth century, when this trend was dramatically reversed.
For example, Kitamura and Lagerlöf (2016) show that borders declined monotonically from
1500 to 1900, and then started to increase. Medieval Europe was fragmented into hundreds
of small states at a time when trade was costly, insecure and limited to few commodities.
The early modern period saw important changes in both the economic and the political
organization of the continent. With the Commercial Revolution, trade began to ourish and
the feudal system started to be replaced by a smaller number of countries of growing size.
While in 1600 there were 112 sovereign states in Europe and the Near East, at the beginning
of 1800 the number had fallen to 79.
The Industrial Revolution gave trade an even more prominent role and triggered ma-
jor changes in socioeconomic conditions that ultimately made the rise of the nation state
possible. Trade expansion was enabled by the introduction of canals, improved roads and
railways. At the same time, the high degree of political fragmentation at the time of the
Congress of Vienna (1815) was followed by the unication of Germany and Italy (1871) and
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the further consolidation of other nation states. The economic rationale of building large
internal markets was especially evident in the case of German unication, which started
with the formation of a customs union (Zollverein). This process of political centralization
culminated at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Europe was dominated by just
28 independent states.
Yet, the twentieth century marks a turning point. It saw the rise of international organi-
zations both at the global level, such as the League of Nations, and at the regional level, such
as the European Community. One of the key objectives of many of these supra-national or-
ganizations was precisely to promote free markets. Simultaneously, Europe entered a stage
of political fragmentation, with the number of independent states growing to 58 in 2000.
This pattern of an initial decline and subsequent increase in the number of countries is not
conned to Europe only. For instance, the number of African countries fell from 36 in 1816 to
4 in 1914, to rise again to 51 in 2000. Similarly, in South-East Asia, these numbers changed
from 37 to 4 and then 20 in the years 1816, 1914 and 2000, respectively.23 However, to better
interpret the political evolutions in these regions, it is important to bring conict into the
picture.
The Rise and Fall of Colonial Empires Our model of war and conquest is broadly
consistent with the rise and fall of colonial empires. In our theory, empires are built to
extract trade surplus from the colonies and disappear when the union is formed to foster free
markets. According to historians and in line with this view, one of the key driving forces
behind colonial expansion was the desire to secure trade and access to scarce resources in an
era of revived commerce, but when mercantilist practices where common. In fact, for much
of the second millennium, states deployed force to create markets (Findlay and ORourke,
2007). Due to the scarcity of land and the desire to avoid powerful rivals, European great
powers expanded by conquering territories overseas. The role of colonial powers in enforcing
trade within the empire but not outside was very clear in the case of maritime commerce.
On the one hand, large naval forces were built to control and protect trading routes; on the
other hand, privateers were often authorized to capture merchant ships belonging to enemy
nations. Despite some notable setbacks, colonialism continued to grow prior to World War I
and nally collapsed after World War II.
The sharp decline of empires started after the creation of international agreements aimed
at promoting economic cooperation. This is no coincidence. In the words of Spruyt (2005)
23The number of countries is taken from Butcher and Gri¢ ths (2013).
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Figure 11: Europe before World War I (1914)
and Rosecrance (1986), empires dissolved, often peacefully, because the gains through com-
merce displaced gains through territorial acquisition.24 There is also evidence that inter-
national organizations played a direct role in the process of decolonization. For example,
in 1960 the UN General Assembly voted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Interestingly, our model of regional unions is consistent
with the very di¤erent patterns of geographic expansions of empires and unions. As long as
war is the dominant means of territorial expansion, the European Great Powers try to avoid
conict with each others by conquering far-away colonies and building global empires. Yet,
once trade is enforced by peaceful international unions, countries seek economic integration
with proximate partners, with whom the gains from trade are higher. The switch from global
empires to regional economic unions is also consistent with the increased regionalization of
world trade patterns observed in the data (e.g., Fouquin and Hugot 2016).
Focusing on size, our model shares with Alesina and Spolaore (2003) the prediction that
24Bonfatti (2012) also attributes the fall of empires to the growing importance of trade between industrial
countries relative to trade with colonies.
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Figure 12: Europe Today (2014)
empires should be larger than democratic countries, a result which is conrmed by a quick
look at Figure 2. Moreover, the model suggest that countries may form and grow for the
desire to increase military might and build an empire or embark into colonial adventures.
This is indeed one of the recognized reasons behind the unication of Germany. Interestingly,
our theory also suggests that great powers switch to the union at higher levels of globalization
than consensual countries.25 Consistently, Figure 2 shows that size started to fall earlier on
for countries than for empires.
The United States Our model can also be used to interpret the founding and growth
of the United States. Improvements in transportation technology and the desire to create
a large internal market were important factors in its westward expansion. The abundance
of land made it possible to create one of the largest countries in the world, without the
need to seek far away colonies. Despite its size, the United States avoided the phase of
25Formally, the emergence of empires unambiguously retards the creation of the world union. Moreover,
unions of free countries may emerge earlier, with empires joining later on.
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collapse and political fragmentation by choosing an institutional system with multiple levels
of government. In this light, the experience of the United States follows the main pattern
predicted by our theory: the creation and expansion of the federal government, which can be
interpreted as a regional union, coincided with the fragmentation and loss of political power
of individual states.
After the Declaration of Independence, the borders of the original thirteen states extended
up to the Mississippi river, while the remaining land was occupied by French and Spanish
colonies (later on part of Mexico) and by many tribes of native Americans living essentially
in autarky. As the federal government acquired land and built roads westward, its territory
was gradually fragmented into the fty states. This process followed a common pattern.
First, new land was annexed as large territories;subsequently this land was broken into
new states. Federal expansion was followed not just by the creation of new states, but also
by the break-up of existing ones. For example, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina and
Virginia all lost land to form new states. So did the former Republic of Texas (an independent
country until 1846), which encompassed large parts of current Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado,
Wyoming and New Mexico. This pattern is consistent with our core-periphery model, in
which the outward expansion of the core union breaks up countries in the periphery.
Trade and the Size of Countries in Ancient History Our theory has been motivated
by modern and contemporary political and economic events because our model of trade and
globalization seems especially suited to study the period after the Industrial Revolution. Yet,
some of its key implications seem consistent with ancient history as well. For instance, several
historians stress the importance of trade and market size for the expansion of countries.
According to Pirenne (1925, 1939), the Roman civilization was heavily dependent upon
Mediterranean trade and it collapsed when trade ended with the Arab conquest.26 In his
view, the cutting of major trade routes forced individual regions into self-su¢ ciency and
this contributed to the consequent decline and fragmentation of Western civilization into the
Middle Ages.
The Past and Future of the European Union Finally, we conclude this sections with
some considerations on the past and future of the European Union. In light of recent events,
this is a question that our theory cannot neglect. The main result of the core-periphery
26Similary, Friedman (1977) argues that trade increases the value of land and hence promotes territorial
expansion.
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model is that international unions start from countries that have closer economic ties and
expands outward as globalization increases the value of trade with more remote locations
as well. This prediction is consistent with the history of the EU, which started in 1957
when Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany signed the
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community as a customs union. The
EEC gradually expanded to include nearby countries: Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986. In 1992, the Maastricht
Treaty converted the EEC into the EU and, in 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined.
In 2002, the Euro was launched and since then the EU has grown to include 28 member
states in 2013. Over this period, the union has grown in size and scope.
In June 2016, however, the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to leave the union and
there is a concern that other countries might follow in the future. While rising nationalism
certainly played a pivotal role, it is nevertheless instructive to look at these events from the
lens of our model. Three lessons can be learned. First, the value of union membership is
proportional to the economic ties between countries. These are stronger for countries located
in the core of continental Europe. For instance, while almost 80% of Belgiums total exports
are delivered to other EU partners, the same gure is around 50% for the United Kingdom.
Second, our model provides a rationale for trade-promoting unions. As more power is shifted
to the union in other areas, tension may arise, especially in countries with a strong national
identity. These two observations may explain why some UK politicians have advanced the
idea of replacing the EU market with a Commonwealth free-trade zone. Third, the model
suggests that the value of joining the union is proportional to its size. As a country exits,
the economic foundations of the union become more fragile.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied how the forces of globalization contribute to shape the worlds
political structure. Our theory has shown that the expansion of trade opportunities can help
explain two salient puzzling phenomena in recent history. First, the rise and subsequent
fall in the size of countries observed during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Second,
the seemingly contradictory trends towards more political integration across countries and
more political fragmentation within countries in the second half of the twentieth century.
Our theory also accounts for the rise and fall of colonial empires, and it is broadly consistent
with a variety of historical episodes. Yet, there are several important factors that we have
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deliberately left aside. We now briey mention three that seem particularly promising for
future research.
First, we have modeled economic unions as agreements aimed at facilitating trade. Al-
though this approach is both simple and realistic, it does not do full justice to another
important role of unions, namely, to solve cross-border externalities associated with domes-
tic government activity (Alesina, Angeloni and Etro 2005). Since globalization is likely to
exacerbate such policy externalities (Epifani and Gancia 2009; Broner and Ventura 2011), it
increases the value of forming unions. However, in this case international agreements must
be properly designed to eliminate any incentive for individual countries to free ride. More
generally, in the presence of such externalities, studying the desirability of di¤erent rules or
mechanisms to determine changes in political structure seems an important open question.
Second, we have focused on economic globalization as an expansion of trade opportunities.
Yet, globalization is a more complex process that may also a¤ect preferences. If cultural
globalization lowers the preference for heterogeneity, it will also reduce the cost of removing
borders.27 Such cultural change may reinforce political integration, but it may also lower
the value of economic unions. The equilibrium political structure may then be the result of
a race between economic and cultural globalization. In a similar vein, preferences may be
a¤ected by political choices. For example, historically governments have often taken actions
aimed at homogenizing their populations (Alesina and Reich 2015; Alesina, Reich and Riboni
2017).
Finally, our concept of locality abstracts from internal heterogeneity both in preferences
and economic attributes. Yet, historical experience suggests that internal conict has played
a role in many processes of country formation and break-up (Bolton and Roland 1996, 1997).
It would be interesting to see how globalization also a¤ects political structure through its
e¤ect on domestic heterogeneity and conict.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
The trade share reported in Figure 1 is merchandise exports as percent of GDP in 1990
prices, from Maddison (1995, 2001). Maddison provides trade data for selected countries in
the years 1820, 1870, 1913, 1929, 1950, 1973 and 1998. To avoid compositional e¤ects, we
report the value of merchandise export as a share of GDP for the set of countries with data
for all the years (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States). The trade share computed using the data for all available countries
in every year is very similar to the one displayed in Figure 1.
The number of countries is reported for the same years. Data on the number of countries
in the twentieth century is not very controversial. For the nineteenth century, however,
some leading conventions grossly underestimate the number of countries. For example, the
International System,developed by Singer and Small (1966) and adopted in the Correlates
of War project or in the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, only includes countries
with international recognition. In particular, prior to 1920, the criteria to be recognized
as an independent country were to have population greater than 500,000 and to have had
diplomatic missions at or above the rank of chargé da¤aires with Britain and France. Clearly,
this denition is too strict for our purposes, which require the identication of even relatively
small political units living in economic and political autarky. We follow Butcher and Gri¢ ths
(2013), who recognize the problem and o¤er alternative criteria to identify the number of
countries between 1816 and 2011.
The number of WTO members is from the WTO website.
The size of countries and empires displayed in Figure 2 is from the Cross-National Time-
Series Data Archive (CNTS). It provides data on contiguous territorial area in thousand
square miles for all countries existing in a given year according to the International State
System. In a few instances, missing data have been imputed cross-checking major territorial
changes from other sources (China and Persia before 1860). Area of empire is provided for
a consistent sample of 13 countries: Austria (formerly Austria-Hungary), Belgium, France,
Germany (formerly Prussia), Italy (formerly Sardinia), Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Rus-
sia, Spain, Turkey (formerly the Ottoman Empire), United Kingdom, and United States.
For these countries, empire area includes overseasterritories (i.e., colonies). Data for the
two modern wartime periods, 1914-1918 and 1940-1945 (1938-1954 for Empires) are missing.
European political maps were drawn using the online software GeaCron (http://www.
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geacron.com). This software provides a geo-temporal database that can be used to draw
geopolitical maps of any region in the world, in any given historical time period. The
number of independent states in Europe and Near East reported in Section 6 is taken from
Euratlas-Nüssli (http://www.euratlas.com).
A.2 Computing Equilibrium Consumption
Locality l maximizes the objective function
WMl =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
ln cl (m; i) dmdi (A1)
subject to the following budget constraint:Z 1
0
Z 1
0
pl (m; i) [cl (m; i)  ql (m; i)] dmdi  0, (A2)
where ql (m; i) and pl (m; i) are the production and price of input m of industry i in locality
l. The productions ql (m; i) must be consistent with available technology as described in
the text. Since individuals are atomistic, they take prices as given in their maximization
problems.
We claim now that equilibrium prices are given as follows:
pl (m; i) =
8>><>>:
1 if l = m
e if i 2 [0; ] and IRl=m = 0
e if i 2 (; 1] or IRl=m = 1 but l 6= m.
(A3)
To prove this claim, normalize world income to unity (Y = 1). Note rst that each locality
has unit density of expenditure on each input in each industry. We next examine production.
Consider rst industries that require contract enforcement, i 2 [0; ]. Locality l employs unit
density of labor to produce each non-traded input m for which IRl=m = 0. Thus, output of
each non-traded input has density e , so the value of output has unit density given price e.
The remaining mass
R 1
0
IRl=mdm of industry-i labor is employed to produce an identical mass
of output. Unit density of it is sold domestically at a unit price. The remainder is shipped
in identical amounts to other localities with IRl=m = 1, each of which receives a density e
 
of imports, hence import value of unit density given price e . In industries that do not
require contract enforcement, i 2 (; 1], the whole unit mass of industry-i labor is employed
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to produce the localitys own input variety, which is sold in identical amounts to all other
localities in the world. Thus, the value of sales in each locality of each input in each industry
has unit density, just like expenditure. This proves our claim.28
With these prices at hand, we can compute the equilibrium productions and consumptions
described in the text.
A.3 Dealing with Integer Constraints
A world without unions consists of N 2 N countries. Country n consists of measure Sn > 0
of localities, such that
PN
n=1 Sn = 1 and utilitarian social welfare isW =
PN
n=1 SnW
F (Sn; Sn).
The welfare function
W F (Sn; Sn) =   +  (1   + Sn)  Sn   
Sn
(A4)
is concave in Sn and increasing at Sn = 0. Whenever  > +  it has a unique maximum
at Sn = S1 .
Pareto e¢ ciency then requires that either Sn  S1 for all n = 1; 2; :::; N or Sn  S1 for
all n. Otherwise some localities could leave a country with excessive size Sn > S1 and join
another with insu¢ cient size Sn < S1 , raising the welfare of every locality in both countries.
Utilitarian welfare maximization requires all countries to have the same size. If there are
two countries m and n such that Sm > Sn > S1 , then transferring the marginal locality from
m to n not only raises its welfare, but it also raises the welfare of Sm localities by more than
it lowers the welfare of Sn < Sm localities. Likewise if Sm < Sn < S1 .
Therefore, once integer constraints are taken into account, the utilitarian welfare optimum
without unions is a partition of the world into a number
N1 = arg max
N2N

  + 

1   + 
N

  
N
  N

(A5)
of identical countries. The objective function W has strictly decreasing di¤erences in (N; )
because for any H > L and and NH > NL,
W (NH ; H) W (NH ; L) = 
H   L
NH
< W (NL; H) W (NL; L) = 
H   L
NL
. (A6)
28It is straightforward to show that this equilibrium is unique. First, rule out variation in the prices of
traded inputs since this would generate excess demand (supply) of cheap (expensive) varieties. Second, rule
out that the relative prices of traded and nontraded varieties be above (below) = since this would lead to
an excess demand (supply) of nontraded inputs.
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Thus, the welfare-maximizing number of countries N1 is decreasing in  in the sense of
monotone comparative statics. It is likewise decreasing in , and increasing in  and .
By the same reasoning, the utilitarian welfare optimum with unions is a world union
composed of a number
N2 = arg max
N2N

  
N
  N

(A7)
of identical countries.
A.4 Equilibrium Conditions for the General Model
The general model used in this paper is discussed in Section 5 when we assume that   0
and   0. The model of war and conquest of Section 4 applies in the limit as  ! 0,
while the model of diplomacy in Section 3 applies in the limit as  ! 0 and ! 0. In this
Appendix, we discuss the di¤erent possible equilibria of the general model.
A.4.1 Law and Diplomacy
Assume rst that the core decides to forego warfare and join the free world, so F = 1. Then
we can dene the welfare of core localities as:
WC (SC ; UC) =   + ( + ) (1  ) + (UC + min fUC ; g)    SC   
SC
  IUC (A8)
and the welfare of periphery localities as:
W P (SP ; UP ) =   +  (1   + UP )  SP   
SP
  IUP , (A9)
where IUC and I
U
P are indicator functions that take value 1 if SC = UC and SP = UP ,
respectively, and zero otherwise. Utilitarian social welfare for the entire world equals:
W (SC ; SP ; UC ; UP ) = W
C (SC ; UC) + (1  )W P (SP ; UP ) . (A10)
There are three possible equilibrium political structures. The rst is a single-level gover-
nance structure with countries of optimal sizes
S1C =
s

    ( + ) and S

1P =
s

    , (A11)
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and without any economic unions.29 Utilitarian world welfare under this rst structure is:
W 1  W (S1C ; S1P ; S1C ; S1P )
=   +   + 2 (1  )  2np [    ( + )] + (1  )p (   )o . (A12)
The second potential equilibrium is a two-level governance structure with countries of
optimal size
S2C = S

2P =
r


(A13)
and with a world economic union: UC = UP = 1. Utilitarian world welfare under this second
structure is:
W 2  W (S2C ; S2P ; 1; 1) =   +
 
 + 2
  2p   . (A14)
The third potential equilibrium features a two-level governance structure for the core with
countries of size S3C = S

2C and a core economic union UC = , but a single-level governance
structure for the periphery with countries of size S3P = S

1P and no union (UP = S

3P ).
Utilitarian world welfare under this third structure is:
W 2  W (S2C ; S2P ; 1; 1)
=   +   + 2 (1  ) + ( + ) 2   2 hp + (1  )p (   )i  . (A15)
The equilibrium political structure under diplomacy is the one that delivers the highest
welfare:
arg maxW 3
8>><>>:
(S1C ; S

1P ; S

1C ; S

1P ) if W
1  max fW 2;W 3g
(S2C ; S

2P ; 1; 1) if W
2  max fW 1;W 3g
(S3C ; S

3P ; ; S

3P ) if W
3  max fW 1;W 2g .
(A16)
The core union yields higher welfare than single-level governance (W 3 > W 1) if:
 < 1 ()   ( + )    2
p

hp
  
p
    ( + )
i
, (A17)
for an increasing and concave threshold (@1=@ > 0 > @21=@2) such that @1=@ > 0,
@1=@ > 0, @1=@ < 0, @1=@ > 0 and @1=@ > 0.
29Equation (A11) assumes that  >  2 +  ( + ), so that there is enough preference heterogeneity to
ensure that the optimal core country size is always smaller than the entire core.
49
The core union yields higher welfare than the world union (W 3 > W 2) if:
 > 2 ()   (1 + )  2
p

p
  
p
   

, (A18)
for an increasing and concave threshold (@2=@ > 0 > @22=@2) such that @2=@ > 0,
@2=@ > 0, @2=@ < 0, @1=@ > 0 and @2=@ = 0.
Single-level governance yields higher welfare than the world union (W 1 > W 2) if:
 > 1 + (1  ) 2. (A19)
The two functions 1 () and 2 () have a single crossing because
1 (0) > 2 (0) = 0 and
@2
@
>
@1
@
. (A20)
In other words, the core union can follow but not precede single-level governance and precede
but not follow the world union because
@
@
 
W 2  W 3 =  1  2   (1  )S3P  > 0 (A21)
and
@
@
 
W 3  W 1 =  (   S1C) > 0. (A22)
A.4.2 War and Conquest
If there are empires, the analysis is as essentially as it was in Section 4 for  = 0. The welfare
of core localities that form an imperial metropolis is given by:
Wl = W
E (E) =   + ( + ) (1  ) + ( + ) E   E   
E
  !. (A23)
The optimal size of empires is larger because so are gains from trade within the metropolis:
E =
s

   ( + ) . (A24)
Thus, if core localities build empires their welfare is given by:
WE (E) =   + ( + ) (1  )  2
p
 [   ( + )]  !. (A25)
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The free world contains a measure F < 1   of localities in the periphery. In this case, all
the analysis in Section 4 applies and, in particular, Condition (19) still determines whether
the free world has a single or two-level governance structure.
When are empires formed? In the absence of empires, the welfare of core localities in the
welfare-maximizing political structure is given by:
W FC =
8>><>>:
WC (S1C ; S

1C) if W
1 > max fW 2;W 3g
WC (S2 ; ) if W
2 > max fW 1;W 3g
WC (S2 ; 1) if W
3  max fW 1;W 2g .
(A26)
If WE (E) < W FC , there are no empires, diplomacy prevails and the size of the free world is
F = 1. If instead WE (E)  W FC , there are =E empires of size E, and the size of the
free world is reduced to F = 1  =.
Core localities prefer empires to peaceful countries (WE (E) > WC (S1C ; S

1C)) if:
 > E such that 2
p

hp
    (E + ) 
p
   (E + )
i
= !, (A27)
with @E=@ < 0, @E=@ < 0, @E=@ > 0, @E=@! > 0 and @E=@ = 0.
Core localities prefer empires to the peaceful core union (WE (E) > WC (S2 ; )) if:
 > E ()  ! +  ( + )    2
p

hp
  
p
   ( + )
i
, (A28)
for a concave threshold (@2E=@2 < 0) with
E (E) = 1 (E) and
@E
@
<
@1
@
, (A29)
and such that @E=@ < 0, @E=@ > 0, @E=@! = 1, @E=@ > 0 and @E=@ > 0.
Core localities prefer empires to the peaceful world union (WE (E) > WC (S2 ; 1)) if:
 > E1 ()  ! +  ( + )  2
p

hp
  
p
   ( + )
i
, (A30)
for an increasing and concave threshold (@E1=@ > 0 > @2E1=@2) with
E1 () > E () and
@E
@
<
@E1
@
< 
@1
@
+ (1  ) @2
@
, (A31)
and such that @E1=@ < 0, @E1=@ > 0, @E1=@! = 1, @E1=@ > 0 and @E1=@ > 0.
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